Military Options in Iraq: Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Fellow in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 18, 2005 (pdf)

One key issue in answering questions is whether they are the right questions to ask. Let me begin my testimony by stating that the “options” and questions the Committee has asked us to address are not necessarily the right options and questions. There are five major reasons why this is the case.
First, the questions as presented in the form of the four “options” do not really describe options, and include mixes of different issues and questions. As a result, the answers to each option have to mix positive and negative responses that are not directly connected. In my responses, I have chosen to address each question separately.
Second, from a purely military perspective, the Committee does not address what may be the most important option, or set of issues, affecting the current US effort in Iraq: Whether the mix of Iraqi military, regular police (those on the street or in stations, in traffic or on highways, and at the borders), and police units (Emergency Response Unit and Special Police; the latter include Special Police Commandos, Public Order Brigades and the Mechanized Police Brigade) that is gradually coming on-line in combat-ready form will be effective in replacing Coalition forces, how soon this is likely, and what kind of (and when) reductions in US and allied forces will be possible.